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CONTRACTS 
Kathleen E. Paynet 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the survey period, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
viewed three cases in which the recurring issue of the proper mea-
sure of damages in a breach of contract action was the focal point 
of the decision. The three areas of law at issue were: (1) speculative 
and uncertain damages; (2) limitation of remedies and consequent-
ial damages under the Uniform Commercial Code; and (3) quan-
tum meruit recovery in the absence of an enforceable contract. 
Three additional cases decided during the survey period in-
volved contract issues. The Sixth Circuit examined two trouble-
some contract areas: application of statute of limitations provisions 
in breach of warranty actions and application of the parol evidence 
rule. In a third case the court analyzed the effect of a breach in one 
contract of a series, on the performance obligations of the non-
breaching party in the remaining contracts. 
I. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 
A. Speculative and Uncertain Damages 
In Booker v. Ralston Purina Co., 1 the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, applying Tennessee law in a diversity action, affirmed the 
district court's holding that damages were limited to the royalties 
owed plaintiff, Booker, for the sale of 268 cases of a frozen entree 
product. Plaintiff appealed the damage award arguing that the 
judge erred in limiting the damage remedy to the cases of frozen 
food actually sold. The breach of contract stemmed from the de-
fendant's failure to test-market and mass-market, as promised, a 
frozen food product developed by the plaintiff. Under such circum-
stances, damages based upon cases actually sold did not fairly 
t J.D., Detroit College of Law, 1977; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1981; Associate 
Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. 
1. 699 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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compensate the plaintiff. As a result, plaintiff sought damages 
based upon one of four alternative methods: a preconceived con-
tract value, prospective profits on the marketing of the new prod-
uct, lost opportunity, or a reasonable rental value for use of plain-
tiff's idea. The Sixth Circuit rejected all four methods as being too 
speculative and uncertain.2 
The Sixth Circuit specifically denied recovery based on a lump-
sum payment for "what both parties may have felt was an accurate 
value figure."3 The court noted that plaintiff had an opportunity to 
take a lump-sum payment at the inception of the contract. He 
chose instead to receive royalties, based on the number of cases of 
the product actually sold, as compensation for defendant's use of 
plaintiff's innovative and untried product. Plaintiff gambled that 
royalty payments over a period of years would be more profitable 
than the outright sale of his idea for a set price. Plaintiff freely 
negotiated the remuneration term of the agreement, accordingly, 
the court was unwilling to rewrite the term.4 
Plaintiff's second method for measuring damages involved a cal-
culation of prospective profits lost as a result of defendant's failure 
to proceed with the testing and marketing. Here, the Sixth Circuit 
was faced with evaluating plaintiff's loss in light of the conserva-
tive approach Tennessee courts have taken with respect to pro-
spective profit loss resulting from a breach of contract. I> The old 
rule that lost profits are not recoverable due to the speculative na-
ture of the remedy has been frequently rejected and replaced by a 
"reasonable certainty" standard.6 Jurisdictions differ, however, in 
their application of the "reasonable certainty" standard7 and Ten-
2. Id. at 335. 
3. Id. at 336. 
4. Id. 
5. See, e.g., Maple Manor Hotel, Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 543 S.W.2d 593 
(Tenn. App. 1975)(lost profits denied where apartment complex had not been completed); 
Anderson-Gregory Co. v. Lea, 51 Tenn. App. 612, 370 S.W.2d 934 (1963)(lost profits de-
nied where plaintiff had never conducted dredging operations and showed no ascertainable 
method of evaluating future profits). But see Ferrell v. Elrod, 63 Tenn. App. 129, 469 
S.W.2d 678 (1971)(lost profits in a new business recoverable where shown with reasonable 
certainty by actual experience subsequent to the breach). 
6. See, e.g., Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 396 Mich. 639, 242 N.W.2d 372 (1976); Continen-
tal Plants Corp. v. Measured Mktg. Serv., Inc., 274 Or. 621, 547 P.2d 1368 (1976); Certain-
Teed Prod. Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 26 Md. App. 452, 339 A.2d 302 
(1975). 
7. The requirement of certainty is a significant limitation on the awarding of contract 
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nessee falls on the more conservative end of the spectrum. The 
rule requiring a reasonable degree of certainty in the proof is not a 
rule preventing the recovery of profits or other damages, but rather 
a rule requiring the presentation of evidence to afford a reasonable 
basis for awarding the damages, aside from sympathy and feelings 
alone.8 
Thus, the question on appeal was whether the plaintiff's proofs 
established with reasonable certainty the projected lost profits. 
Plaintiff argued that the lost profits could be calculated from de-
fendant's various projections, formulated at the onset of the con-
tract and used as a basis for determining the propriety of entering 
the contract.9 In evaluating these proofs, the Sixth Circuit rea-
soned that the untried and highly innovative product was similar 
to a new business. Although damages may be established with the 
aid of expert testimony, economic and financial data, market 
surveys and analyses (as in this case), or business records of similar 
enterprises,IO Tennessee case law has consistently rejected recovery 
based on future profits of a new business. 11 In applying Tennessee 
law, it is not surprising that the Sixth Circuit agreed with the dis-
trict court's judgment that lost profits were too speculative and un-
certain to sustain a damage award. Similarly, the court summarily 
rejected the arguments for increased damages based upon a lost 
opportunity or rental value.llI 
damages. See Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489 (1858)(the leading New York case in which the 
doctrine was formulated). Contemporary cases require only reasonable certainty: "Damages 
are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established 
with reasonable certainty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1979). 
What is meant by "certainty" or "reasonable certainty" is unclear. The standard requires 
"that the quality of the evidence must be of a higher caliber than is needed to establish 
most other factual issues in a lawsuit." J. CALAMARI & J. PERRILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
529 (1977) (CALAMARI & PERRILLO). 
8. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, §§ 1020, 1022 (1964). 
9. 699 F.2d at 336. Booker and Ralston conducted extensive negotiations before agreeing 
on a marketing contract based on royalties. Before entering into the agreement, Ralston 
conducted marketing projections which indicated that Booker's product looked potentially 
profitable. [d. at 335. 
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 comments (1979). 
11. 699 F.2d at 336 n.3. 
12. Lost opportunity and rental value are treated as alternative methods of recovery 
when an aggrieved party cannot establish lost profits with sufficient certainty. CALAMARI & 
PERRILLO, supra note 7, at 532 and 535; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 887 (1982). 
The lost opportunity alternative appears applicable when evaluated with the rationale set 
forth by the treatise writers. CALAMARI & PERRILLO, supra note 7, at 534. However, the 
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As previously stated, "reasonable certainty" refers to the quality 
of proof presented. Although courts almost uniformly use this lan-
guage, the stringency of its application varies from one jurisdiction 
to the next. Some courts arbitrarily prohibit a new business from 
recovering for lost profits. IS A more realistic and accurate approach 
is that a new business faces a greater burden of proof.14 The con-
servative nature of the Tennessee approach, applied by the Sixth 
Circuit in this case, is further illustrated by a 1977 case denying a 
lost profits recovery to an ongoing business where past sales could 
be compared. 111 
instant facts do not fit within the limitation imposed by the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 
332 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(3) (1979). Both sections limit applica-
tion of the alternative remedy to aleatory promises. The rental value alternative is applied 
where the breach of contract is one that has delayed or prevented the use of the property. 
Cases where this alternative has been approved include defective machinery rendering the 
property inoperative and delayed completion of construction resulting in unoccupied prop-
erty. It should be noted that "since rental value depends on what the property would com-
mand on the market and that, in term, depends on the profits may result in uncertainty as 
to rental value." FARNSWORTH, supra, at 887. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348 (1979) provides: 
Id. 
(1) If a breach delays the use of property and the loss in value to the injured party 
is not proved with reasonable certainty, he may recover damages based on the 
rental value of the property or on interest on the value of the property. 
(2) If a breach results in defective or unfinished construction and the loss in value 
to the injured party is not proved with sufficient certainty, he may recover dam-
ages based on 
(a) the diminution in the market price of the property caused by the 
breach, or 
(b) the reasonable cost of completing performance or of remedying the de-
fects if that cost is not clearly disproportionate to the probable loss in value 
to him. 
(3) If a breach is of a promise conditioned on a fortuitous event and it is uncertain 
whether the event would have occurred had there been no breach, the injured 
party may recover damages based on the value of the conditional right at the time 
of breach. 
13. Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 206 Md. 610, 112 A.2d 901 (1955). 
14. Handi Caddy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 557 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1977). 
15. Joy Floral Co. v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 563 S.W.2d 190 (Tenn. App. 1977)(lost 
profits denied for alleged decrease in sales resulting from telephone company's failure to list 
plaintiff's main office in the white pages). Cf. Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 396 Mich. 639, 242 
N.W.2d 372 (1976). Fera recovered lost profits where extensive evidence was admitted at 
trial regarding the issue of the reasonable certainty of the lost profits resulting from a 
breach of a business lease. The Michigan Supreme Court, reversing the Michigan Court of 
Appeals, held that, although plaintiff's endeavor was a new business, lost profits were not 
precluded by the reasonable certainty standard. ,The court emphasized that the rule is one 
of sufficiency of proof and that mathematical precision is not required. Rather the nature of 
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On the other end of the spectrum is the case of Lee v. Seagram 
& Sons, Inc. 1e In Lee, the former half owners in a wholesale liquor 
distributorship were awarded damages based on lost profits from a 
new distributorship which they never owned. Defendant was found 
in breach of an oral promise to relocate plaintiff in the new distrib-
utorship as consideration for the sale of the old distributorship. 
After considering other evidentiary and contract issues, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lost profits damage remedy of 
$407,850. At trial, a certified public accountant presented evidence 
that estimated the lost profits from the never acquired new distrib-
utorship by the profits of plaintiff's old distributorship, even 
though the new distributorship was never identified. The court 
held that the award of damages was not too speculative or uncer-
tain.17 Since the defendant's breach caused the difficulty in proving 
damages, the defendant bore the risk of uncertainty created by its 
own conduct. IS Although probably a minority position, other courts 
have approved establishing prospective lost profits by comparison 
with those of similar businesses. 19 
As noted above, the Booker case represents a conservative ap-
proach to the measure of damages in a breach of contract action. 
The approach, limiting recovery to actual sales with no recovery 
for lost profits or lost opportunity, appears to be at odds with the 
principle that "a man should not profit by his own wrong."20 The 
basic premise that "the aim in awarding damages is to put the in-
jured party in as good a position as full performance would have 
put him"21 supports a more liberalized test of reasonable certainty. 
Doubt should be resolved against the party in breach.22 How-
the circumstances, particularly where defendant's breach caused the imprecision, is determi-
native in applying the reasonable certainty standard. [d. See also Upjohn Co. v. Rachelle 
Laboratories, Inc., 661 F.2d 1105, 1113-14 (6th Cir. 1981)(absolute certainty is not required 
under Fera); The Vogue v. Shopping Centers, Inc., 402 Mich. 546, 226 N.W.2d 148, on re-
mand, 86 Mich. App. 110, 272 N.W.2d 205 (1978)(applied the Fera analysis). 
16. 552 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1977), amended on other grounds, 592 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1979). 
17. 552 F.2d at 455. 
18. [d. See also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946). 
19. Leoni v. Bemis Co., 255 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 1977)(profits lost by nationwide business 
when breach of contract prevented it from expanding to California were shown by compari-
son with its profits in other states). 
20. See Kaufman, 12 ST. MARY's L.J. 77,89 (1980). 
21. Kaufman, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 992, at 142 (1982 Supp., Part 2). 
22. Doubts are generally resolved against the party in breach. A party who has, by his 
breach, forced the injured party to seek compensation in danl8ges should not be allowed to 
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ever, until more jurisdictions follow the Second Circuit's rationale 
in the Lee case, this commentator recommends the use of liqui-
dated damage clauses in contracts involving new businesses or 
products. With a reasonable liquidated damage provision the non-
breaching party is compensated without having to establish, with 
certainty, the loss suffered. 
B. Limitation of Remedies and Consequential Damages under 
the Uniform Commercial Code 
The case of Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable 
and Cold Storage CO.,23 required construction and application of 
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provisions regarding the 
limitation of buyer's remedies. Specifically, the issue presented was 
whether an exclusion of a consequential damages clause may be 
given effect where a limited remedy provision has failed of its es-
sential purpose. 
The Lewis case arose out of a written agreement providing for 
the sale of a freezer. The agreement contained express warranties 
and remedy provisions limited to repair, replacement or rescission. 
The printed portion of the contract included an exclusion of conse-
quential damages clause.24 Sawyer failed to pay the balance due on 
the contract when Lewis was unable to promptly repair the freezer 
to meet performance warranties. Lewis sued for the contract price 
and Sawyer counterclaimed asserting breach of contract, breach of 
warranty and misrepresentation. At trial, a jury awarded Sawyer 
$25,823 in lost profits and $27,080 in excess Freon costs. 
profit from his breach where it is established that a significant loss has occurred. A court 
may take into account all the circumstnces of the breach, including willfulness, in deciding 
whether to require a lesser degree of certainty, giving greater discretion to the trier of facts. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352, comments (1979). 
23. 709 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1983). 
24. The facts with reference to the terms of the contract are confusingly stated. Pages 7-
12 of the contract contained standard printed terms; pages 2-7 were typewritten. 709 F.2d at 
428. The printed portion of the contract contained the remedy limitation provisions. The 
printed portion also contained the exclusion of consequential damages provision despite the 
incorrect reference to "handwritten" at page 428. See 709 F.2d at 435 n.18. The typewritten 
portion of the contract contained the warranty provisions that: (1) the freezer was capable 
of processing six thousand pounds of various fruits per hour; (2) the freezer would use no 
more than 1.8 liquid pounds of Freon per 100 pounds of frozen products; and (3) for a 
period of time seller would supply the Freon that the freezer consumed over the warranty 
period. 
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Lewis raised three commercial law issues on appeal which fo-
cused on an application of the Washington version211 of V.C.C. sec-
tions 2-71428 and 2_719.27 First, Lewis challenged the jury's award 
of lost profits in light of the repair and rescission limitations ex-
25. The agreement provided that Washington law would govern. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 
440.1105 (1967) permits such a choice. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit correctly looked to 
Washington statutory law for guidance. 
26. U.C.C. § 2-714 (1978) dealing with buyers damages in a breach of warranty actions 
provides: 
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification (subsection (3) of 
Section 2-607) he may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the 
loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as deter-
mined in any manner which is reasonable. 
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time 
and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value 
they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances 
show proximate damages of a different amount. 
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under the next 
section may also be recovered. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Washington version is identical. W.R.C. 62 A. 2-714 (1974). 
27. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1978) providing for modification or limitation of Code remedies 
states: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and of the 
preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages, 
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitu-
tion for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter the measure of 
damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting the buyer's remedies 
to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and replace-
ment of non-conforming goods or parts; and 
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is ex-
pressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy. 
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essen-
tial purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act. 
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or 
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the 
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation 
of damages where the loss is commercial is not. 
Subsection (3) of the Washington statute is non-uniform and provides: 
(3) Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of 
goods purchased primarily for personal, family or household use or of any services 
related thereto is invalid unless it is proved that the limitation is not unconsciona-
ble. Limitation of remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts or non-con-
forming goods is invalid in sales of goods primarily for personal, family or house-
hold use unless the manufacturer or seller maintains or provides within this state 
facilities adequate to provide reasonable and expeditious performance of repair or 
replacement obligations. 
Limitation of other consequential damages is valid unless it is established that the 
limitation is unconscionable. 
W.R.C. 62 A 2-719(3) (1974). 
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pressed in the contract. The Sixth Circuit determined that al-
though remedy limitations are permissible under the V.C.C.,28 a 
jury could have reasonably found that the remedy limitations in 
the Lewis-Sawyer contract failed of their essential purpose and, 
therefore, the general remedy provisions under the U.C.C. were 
applicable. 
Buyers frequently resort to section 2-719(2), advancing the argu-
ment that an exclusive or limited contractual remedy has failed of 
its essential purpose.29 This is particularly true in cases where the 
exclusive remedy is limited to repair or replacement,30 a typical 
commercial contract provision. The difficult question for courts is 
the factual determination of what is required for such a remedy to 
"fail of its essential purpose." The V.C.C. Official Comments 
(Comments) provide that "an apparently fair and reasonble" limi-
tation clause "must give way to the general remedy provisions" of 
Article 2 when the clause "operates to deprive either party of the 
substantial value of the bargain. "31 The buyer is said to be de-
prived of the substantial value of the bargain where the seller fails 
to timely or successfully perform the repair obligation.32 
The instant case is illustrative. The Sixth Circuit found that suf-
ficient evidence was presented to permit a reasonble jury to con-
clude that the repair limitation failed when Lewis was unable to 
28. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(1978), supra note 26, consistent with the U.C.C. philosophy of 
freedom of contract, permits parties to devise specialized remedies to meet the particular 
requirements and risk allocations of the individual contract. 
29. For numerous cases, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 466-469 (1980); Eddy, "Essential" Purposes of Limited Reme-
dies, 65 CAL. L. REV. 28 (1977); ANDERSEN, "Failure of Essential Purpose and Essential 
Failure on Purpose," 31 Sw. L.J. 759 (1977). 
30. Eddy, supra note 29, at 85; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 469. 
31. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1978). 
32. The court in Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973) held as 
follows: 
The purpose of an exclusive remedy of replacement or repair of defective parts, 
the presence of which constitute a breach of an express warranty, is to give the 
seller an opportunity to make the goods conforming while limiting the risks to 
which he is subject by excluding direct or consequential damages that might oth-
erwise arise. From the point of view of the buyer the purpose of the exclusive 
remedy is to give him goods that conform to the contract within a reasonable time 
after a defective part is discovered . . . . The limited, exclusive remedy fails of its 
purpose and is thus avoided under § 2-719(2), whenever the warrantor fails to 
correct the defect within a reasonable period. 
Id. at 426. 
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fully repair the freezer;33 and that the rescission limitation failed 
when the circumstances made it "exceedingly impractical to carry 
out the essence of an agreed-upon remedy."34 Relevant to the re-
scission limitation, evidence was presented at trial to support a 
finding that Lewis deliberately concealed the freezer's inability to 
meet cherry processing warranties.3& Accordingly, it was reasonable 
to conclude that Sawyer, having made other business commit-
ments, would have been severely disadvantaged financially by a 
contract rescission. Therefore, the essentail purpose of the rescis-
sion limitation failed. 36 
Although the Sixth Circuit's application of the "exceedingly im-
practical" standard to U.C.C. section 2-719(2) may differ from 
tests defined in other circuits,3? the Lewis court had to apply a test 
to the exceptional case where an alleged latent defect prevented 
rescission and not merely repair.38 Rescission, as a limited alterna-
tive to an exclusive repair or replace clause, is extremely unsatis-
factory where a substantial period of time has lapsed, the goods 
have not been repaired, and the buyer had suffered consequential 
damages while awaiting cure.39 
Upon resolving the remedy limitation issue in favor of aggrieved 
buyer, Sawyer, the Sixth Circuit was then required to determine 
33. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Reg. Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980). In 
Chatlos, the Third Circuit recognized that "courts generally have concluded that so long as 
the buyer has the use of substantially defect-free goods, the limitation should be given ef-
fect. But when the seller is either unwilling or unable to confrom the goods to the contract, 
the remedy does not suffice." Id. at 1085, citing Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670 (5th 
Cir. 1971) as an example. 
34. 709 F.2d at 43l. 
35. Id. at 432. 
36. Id. 
37. See, e.g., Delhomme Indus., Inc. v. Houston Beechcraft, Inc., 669 F.2d 1049, 1063 
(5th Cir. 1982)(the test in determining whether a limited warranty fails of its essential pur-
pose is whether seller can provide buyer with conforming goods within a reasonable time); 
Marr Enter. v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 556 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1977)(the Ninth Circuit rec-
ognized both a latent defect test and seller's inability or unwillingness to cure test); Chatlos 
v. National Cash Reg. Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3rd Cir. 198O)(the Third Circuit recognized the 
seller's inability or unwillingness to cure test). 
38. 709 F.2d at 432. 
39. One court held such a limitation to be unconscionable where the manufacturer knew 
the product's effectiveness was questionable and the purchaser suffered excessive foresee-
able consequential damages for crop failure. Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 
20 (D. Ala. 1975). For another case where a rescission or refund remedy failed of its essential 
purpose, see Earl M. Jorgenson Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Hawaii 466, 540 P.2d 978 
(1975). 
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the second issue: whether V.C.C. section 2-714(2) prevented the 
award of consequential damages. Lewis argued that section 2-
714(2) limited buyer's remedy to benefit of the bargain damages. 
The Sixth Circuit, however, correctly decided that consequential 
damages are permissible under section 2-714(3)40 and section 2-
715(2)41 provided that they are foreseeable and cannot be miti-
gated by cover. Thus, the Sixth Circuit again resolved the issue in 
favor of Sawyer. 
The third commercial law issue called for an application of 
V.C.C. section 2-719(3), which specifically authorizes the exclusion 
of consequential damages in a sale of commercial goods unless it is 
established that the limitation is unconscionable.42 The question 
presented was whether the failure of an exclusive remedy provision 
under section 2-719(2), triggering Article 2 remedies, prohibited 
application of an exclusion of consequential damages provision. 
This recurring issue had plagued courts and resulted in a split in 
authority.43 One view prohibits application of the exclusionary 
clause based upon the unambiguous language of section 2-719(2). 
The language "remedy may be had as provided in this Act" in-
cludes the remedy of consequential damages44 under section 2-
715.4& Another view, and the one followed in this case, provides 
40. See supra note 25. 
41. U.C.C. § 2-715 (1978) provides: 
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's breach include expenses reason-
ably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods 
rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions 
in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to 
the delay or other breach. 
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include 
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of 
which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which 
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and 
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of 
warranty. 
The Washington version is identical. W.R.C. 62A. 2-715 (1974). 
42. On the other hand, consequential damages are prima facie unconscionable as applied 
to consumer goods. U.C.C. § 2-719(3). See 709 F.2d at 434 n.8. See supra note 26 for the 
Washington version of unconscionability and consumer goods. 
43. Eddy, supra note 29, at 84. 
44. See, e.g., Fargo Machine & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 
21 U.C.C. 80 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Morris v. Chevrolet Motor Div. of General Motors Corp., 39 
Cal. App. 3d 917,114 Cal. Rptr. 747, 14 V.C.C. 1294 (1974); Adams v. J. I. Case Co., 125 Ill. 
App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d I, 7 V.C.C. 1270 (1970). 
45. V.C.C. § 2-715(2)(1978), supra note 41. 
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that the separate clause excluding consequential damages stands or 
falls independently of the limited remedy provision which failed of 
its essential purpose.·s Under this analysis the question is whether 
the exclusion of consequential damages is unconscionable:·? One 
commentator maintains that focusing upon unconscionability al-
lows a distinction to be drawn between willful behavior and simple 
inability to perform!S In some jurisdictions a different rule applies 
depending upon whether the contractual provisions excluding lia-
bility for consequential damages accomplish the exclusion directly 
by specific provision or indirectly by relegating the buyer's re-
course to an exclusive remedy!e 
In the instant case, the printed portion of the contract excluded 
46. 709 F.2d at 435. See, e.g., Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 
262, 22 U.C.C. 407 (D. Me. 1977); Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C.App. 503, 267 S.E.2d 
919 (1980). -
47. A consequential damage exclusion is ineffective only if unconscionable, wholly apart 
from whether or not an exclusive remedy has failed of its essential purpose. Kohlenberger, 
Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 256 Ark. 584,510 S.W.2d 555 (1974). The question of conscion-
ability is decided by the court: 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract 
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to 
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause 
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the 
court in making the determination. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978). 
The Washington version is uniform. See W.R.C. 62A. 2-302 (1974). 
48. Eddy, supra note 29, at 91. Professor Eddy justifies differentiating between willful 
behavior and inability because U[nJearly all of the cases in a commercial setting that do 
allow recovery of consequential damages involve such a willful failure to perform the repair 
obligation." [d. But see American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 
435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), where the court upheld the provision in the contract excluding conse-
quential damages despite seller's willful refusal to honor the repair or replacement 
obligation. 
49. See Beal, supra note 32. The case appears to stand for the proposition that conse-
quential damages are recoverable whenever an exclusive remedy fails of its essential pur-
pose. It should be noted, however, that in Beal there may not have been a separate provi-
sion in the contract excluding liability for consequential damages. Accordingly, the court's 
holding may result from the absence of a clause excluding consequential damages. Accord-
ingly, the court's holding may result from the absence of a clause excluding consequential 
damages. For another contract containing no separate clause excluding consequential dam-
ages, see Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Servo 
1219 (W.O. Pa. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1205, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Servo 81 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970). 
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consequential damages. Sawyer argued that the consequential 
damage exclusion failed of its essential purpose along with the re-
pair and rescission limitations. 50 The Lewis court reasoned that 
U.C.C. section 2-719(3) takes priority over U.C.C. section 2-719(2) 
when the parties agreed to exclude consequential damages. Agree-
ing with the Third and Ninth Circuits, the court determined that a 
consequential damage disclaimer is an independent provision, valid 
unless found to be unconscionable. III In so deciding, the Sixth Cir-
cuit recognized the basic principle of statutory construction that 
the "particular governs over the general."52 Since the district court 
had permitted the recovery of lost profits, clearly a consequential 
damage remedy, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for a deter-
mination of whether the consequential damage limitation was un-
conscionable. Unless the district judge determines on remand that 
the limitation is unconscionable, the jury award of $25,823 in lost 
profits must be set aside. 53 The appellate court found that the 
jury's award of $27,080 in Freon costs would be upheld, 54 in any 
event, as incidentalGG rather than consequential damages . 
• In summary, the remand in the Lewis case to determine whether 
the consequential damage exclusion was unconscionable supports 
the underlying Code policy of freedom of contract, permitting 
merchants to allocate business risks. Where parties of relatively 
equal bargaining power negotiate a price based upon risk allocation 
and expressly exclude any liability for consequential damages, the 
failure of a limited remedy provision is not enough to require the 
seller to absorb losses that the buyer agreed to bear. 56 On the other 
hand, where' the exclusion of a consequential damages provision is 
50. The repair and rescission limitation provisions were also contained in the printed 
portions of the contract. See supra note 23. 
51. 709 F.2d at 434 n.9. But see Deere v. Hand, 211 Neb. 549, 319 N.W.2d 434 (1982); 
Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf, 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977); Bosway Tool & Steel Co. v. Michi-
gan Mach. Co., 65 Mich. App. 426, 237 N.W.2d 48 (1976). 
52. 709 F.2d at 435. 
53. See Delhomme Indus., Inc. v. Houston Beechcraft, 669 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1982)(The 
unconscionable issue is a question of law whereas the failure of essential purpose is a ques-
tion of fact). 
54. 709 F.2d at 436 n.19. 
55. The cost of the additional Freon, since expressly provided for in the contract, could 
probably have been recovered as a primary or direct damage of breach under U.C.C. § 2-
714(2). See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 385, discussing the case of Lewis v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1971). 
56. S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Intern, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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concealed or obscure, and not bargained for by the parties, the ex-
clusion is unconscionable and unenforceable.1S7 By focusing on the 
parties allocation of risk at the time of the contracting and on 
whether the failure of the exclusive remedy has caused conse-
quential loss beyond that which the buyer had agreed to assume, 
the court may determine whether it would be unconscionable for 
such loss to be left on the buyer .1S8 
C. Quantum Meruit Recovery in the Absence of an Enforceable 
Contract 
In Klewicki Co. v. American Screw Products, 1S9 the Sixth Circuit 
reviewed an alleged breach of contract case in which Klewicki, act-
ing as an agent for American Screw, influenced the sales to 
Rockwell-Standard, one of American Screw's prime customers. M-
ter a trial on the merits, the district court determined that the par-
ties had not come to an expressed compensation agreement, but 
that there was an understanding that Klewicki would receive some 
compensation.80 In the absence of an agreement as to the amount 
of compensation the district court ruled that Klewicki was entitled 
to recover in quantum meruit61 and fixed the award at one percent 
of the gross sales to Rockwell for the period involved.62 
57. Jutta's, Inc. v. Fireco Equip. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 301, 375 A.2d 687 (1977). Disparity 
in bargaining power may render an exclusion of consequential damages clause unconsciona-
ble. Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976). In most commercial 
cases, however, this attack on the exclusionary clause will be unsuccessful. WHITE & SUM-
MERS, supra note 29, at 485. For a discussion recommending closer scrutiny by the courts for 
possible unconscionability in commercial computer contracts see Comment, U.C.C. § 2-719 
As Applied to Computer Contracts-Unconscionable Exclusions of Remedy?: Chatlos Sys., 
Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 14 CONN. L. REv. 71 (1981). 
58. ANDERSEN, supra note 29, at 791. 
59. 690 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1982). 
GO. Id. at 86-87. Language used in the opinion makes it unclear whether the contract 
lacked a specific compensation term or whether no contract existed. In view of what the 
court found with reference to the Biagini case, see infra note 63, it is possible that the court 
found that the parties, failing to agree to the essential contract term of remuneration, were 
not contractually bound. Id. at 87. 
61. Quantum meruit developed as a common count of the action of general assumpsit 
for the value of work done (as much as he deserves). Quasi-contract refers to any money 
claim for the redress of unjust enrichment and is the broader category which includes quan-
tum meruit, the form of action used for claims to payment for services. FARNSWORTH, supra 
note 12, at 99. "A quasi contractual obligation is one that is created by the law for reasons 
for justice, without an expression of assent." CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 19 at 46 (1960). 
62. 690 F.2d at 87. Klewicki argued for five percent of the gross sales; American Screw 
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The Sixth Circuit per curiam opinion reviewed the trial court's 
application of Michigan case law on quantum meruit recovery to 
the instant facts. In Biagini v. Mocnik,63 the supreme court re-
stated the Michigan rule that a quantum meruit recovery is per-
missible when it is found, as a matter of fact, that no express con-
tract existed.6• The Biagini court viewed this rule as a corollary to 
the general principle allowing a quantum meruit recovery where 
an express agreement is unenforceable because of the statute of 
frauds or other statute that prevents recovery on the terms of the 
agreement. Accordingly, quantum meruit recovery is available in 
the absence of an enforceable contract. Quantum meruit recovery 
is not available where parties differ as to the terms of an express 
agreement and there is evidence tending to support the claim of 
each party.611 In such a case the trier of fact determines the terms 
of the contract and damages based upon those terms. 
In applying these rules to Klewicki, the Sixth Circuit court must 
have concluded that no enforceable contract existed between 
Klewicki and American Screw, rather than no specific compensa-
tion agreement.66 If the parties were contractually bound but the 
contract contained no remuneration term, the quantum meruit re-
cover was inappropriate.67 
maintained that Klewicki was only entitled to expenses. 
63. 369 Mich. 657, 120 N.W.2d 827 (1963). 
64. Id. at 658-59, 120 N.W.2d at 828. 
65. Id. citing Geistert v. Schemer, 316 Mich. 325, 25 N.W.2d 241 (1946), quoting from 
Millar v. Macy Co. 263 Mich. 484, 248 N.W. 879 (1933). 
66. See supra note 60. "No specific compensation agreement" could mean either no re-
muneration term or no contract. 
67. Under those circumstances either the trier of fact would determine what the terms of 
the contract were, or the court would determine what was a reasonable compensation term 
under the circumstances. See supra note 65 and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
204 (1979), which provides for supplying an omitted essential term as follows: "[w)hen the 
parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect to a 
term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reason-
able in the circumstances is supplied by the court." U.C.C. § 2-305(1)(1978) is the compara-
ble provision for supplying a missing price term: 
Id. 
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though 
the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable price at the time 
for delivery if 
(a) nothing is said as to price; or 
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree; or 
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard 
as set or recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or 
recorded. 
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Klewicki did not present the typical scenario of facts where a 
successful broker is precluded from recovering an otherwise right-
ful commission due to a licensing violation.B8 To the contrary, the 
trial court applied a quantum meruit recovery where the value of 
Klewicki's services may be said to have been somewhat specula-
tive. A quantum meruit recovery is equitable in nature based on 
the principle that parties should be compensated for work per-
formed.Bs The problem, however, in a broker's commission case is 
that a broker typically receives compensation only when he or she 
successfully procures a sale or service. Therefore, the commission 
is not directly related to the work performed. This problem was 
recognized in Bishop v. American States Life Insurance CO.,70 
where the court pointed out that a quantum meruit recovery based 
on the value of services performed, is inconsistent with fact situa-
tions where remuneration is based upon a percentage commission. 
The Sixth Circuit was also faced with precedent which denied a 
quantum meruit recovery to a broker. In Arsham v. Banci,71 the 
Sixth Circuit held that "[a]n unsuccessful broker may not recover 
in quantum meruit when the principal subsequently sells to the 
same person whom the broker has contacted. "72 The Sixth Circuit 
distinguished Arsham from Klewicki emphasizing that Klewicki 
has opened the door to increased sales with Rockwell, and there-
fore was a successful, not an unsuccessful, broker. 
Accordingly, Klewicki permits successful brokers to recover a 
reasonable commission based on the theory of quantum meruit.73 
68. See, e.g., Marina Management Corp. v. Brewer, 572 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1978)(recovery 
barred by a Connecticut licensing statute); Tackett v. Mullins, 612 S.W.2d 909 (Tenn. 
1981)(recovery permitted even though broker had no license); Ricker & Sons v. Students 
Int'l Meditation Soc'y, 501 F.2d 550 (lst Cir. 1974). 
69. See Bishop v. American States Life Ins. Co., 635 S.W.2d 313 (Ky. 1982). "The com-
mon law theory of quantum meruit is rooted in the idea that, any contractual obligation 
notwithstanding, one should be compensated based on the amount of work one has per-
formed (i.e., one gets what one deserves, no more and no less)." [d. at 314. 
70, [d. 
71. 511 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1975). 
72. [d. at 1115 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the court first found that no 
contract existed between Arsham and Banci before examining the possibility of a quantum 
meruit recovery. 
73. 690 F.2d at 87. This rule should only be applied in broker cases in the absence of an 
enforceable contract. -
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The determination of the value of those services7• rests within the 
discretion of the trial judge, guided by principles of equity. 
II. BREACH OF WARRANTY STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
One case during the survey period illustrates the problem courts 
face when application of a statute of limitations provisions pre-
cludes a diligent plaintiff from obtaining a recovery. In Lawson v. 
London Arts Group,7r> the Sixth Circuit was asked to decide 
whether plaintiff's cause of action for breach of an express war-
ranty was timely under two different statute of limitations provi-
sions, and which of the provisions applied. 
Facts recited in the Lawson case indicated that in 1972 Mrs. 
Lawson purchased a pastel from London Arts for $29,000. London 
Arts issued a written warranty of authenticity stating that the pas-
tel was an original work of Frederick Remington.7s In 1976, Mrs. 
Lawson began to question the authenticity of the pastel. After ob-
taining expert opinions that the pastel was indeed a copy, suit was 
brought in 1979 for breach of warranty in the Eastern District 
Court of Michigan. Although not explicitly stated in the opinion,77 
it appears that the breach of warranty action was argued alterna~ 
tively under the Uniform Commercial Code express warranty pro-
vision78 and under Michigan's Warranty in Fine Arts Statute79 
74. The broker is "entitled to recover what his labor rendered or materials furnished 
were reasonably worth." 369 Mich. at 659, 120 N.W.2d at 828. 
75. 708 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1983). 
76. The written warranty of authenticity provided: 
This is to certify that 
An Indian Brave by Frederick Remington 
Drawing done in 1901 
purchased by Mrs. Jerry Lawson 
from Robert James Price 
i8 an original work as described. Should it prove to be other than described, the 
seller will refund the purchase price in full . . . . 
77. This can be gleaned from the fact that the court was asked to choose between the 
U.C.C. statute of limitations provision, § 2-725 and the REVISED JUDICATURE ACT § 600.5833. 
See infra note 83. 
78. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978) provides: 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which 
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an 
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or 
promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the 
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which provides in relevant part: 
when an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine art, fur-
nishes to a buyer of such work who is not an art merchant, a written 
instrument which, in describing the work, identifies it with any author or 
authorship, the description shall be presumed to be part of the basis of 
the bargain and shall create an express warranty of the authenticity of 
the authorship as of the date of the sale or exchange. The warranty shall 
not be negated or limited because the art merchant in the written instru-
ment did not use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or be-
cause he did not have a specific intention or authorization to make a 
warranty or because any statement relevant to authorship is, or purports 
to be, or is capable of being merely the art merchant's opinion.eo 
467 
The jury found that the warranty of authenticity of authorship was 
made in bad faith and awarded the plaintiff $140,000 in damages.s1 
The court of appeals affirmed the district court award, but upon a 
different statutory basis. 
The only issue on appeal was whether Mrs. Lawson's action was 
barred by the statute of limitations since she purchased the pastel 
in February of 1972, but did not file suit until March of 1979.82 
The parties and, apparently, the court of appeals agreed that a 
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
description. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use 
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention 
to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a state-
ment purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods 
does not create a warranty. 
For a discussion of the use of the warranty provisions of the V.C.C. in art fraud cases, see 
Note, Uniform Commercial Code Warranty Solutions to Art Fraud and Forgery, 14 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 409 (1972). 
79. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 442.321-25 (West Supp. 1983), effective January 1, 1971. 
Several states, in addition to Michigan, have enacted special art legislation to supplement 
V.C.C. warranty provisions. See Comment, Consumer Protection Legislation in Sale of 
Original Prints, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 55, at 56 n.13 (1979). 
SO. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 442.322(a)(West Supp. 1983). 
81. 708 F.2d at 228. The Michigan statutory scheme provides that "[aJn art merchant 
whose warranty of authenticity of authorship was made in good faith shall not be liable for 
damages beyond the return of the purchase price which he received." MICH. COMPo LAWS 
ANN. § 442.324(3) (West Supp. 1983). The purchase price was $29,000 in 1972. Expert wit-
nesses testified that the original Remington would have been worth between $150,000 and 
$175,000 at the time of trial. 708 F.2d at 227. The Sixth Circuit treated the difference be-
tween the purchase price and the jury award as consequential damages, presumably loss of 
investment profits on the Remington pastel. See V.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a)(1978). 
82. 708 F.2d at 228. 
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four-year statute of limitations period applied.s3 The question 
presented was when the statutory period began to run. 
Under the U.C.C., the statutory period begins to run under the 
general rule, in a breach of warranty action, upon tender of 
delivery: 
A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty 
occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty 
explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of 
the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action 
accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. Sf 
London Arts maintained that, under this language, Mrs. Lawson's 
cause of action was barred early in 1976, four years after tender of 
delivery, but before Mrs. Lawson knew of the breach. Both the dis-
trict and appellate courts refused to apply this general rule. The 
district court held that the exception to the general rule of section 
2-725(2) applied, that the warranty extended to the "future per-
formance" of the pastel and, consequently, the cause of action ac-
crued when the breach was or should have been discovered. SCi The 
plaintiff did not suspect the pastel was a forgery until 1976; the 
statute of limitations under the district court's view did not, there-
fore, begin to run until 1976. 
Without adequate analysis or reference to any authority, the ap-
pellate court found the district court's application of the exception 
language of section 2-725(2) to be erroneous.SS Nonetheless, the 
Sixth Circuit found Mrs. Lawson's cause of action timely under the 
83. [d. at 228 and 229. A four-year period was appropriate if the cause of action was 
based upon breach of an express warranty under the V.C.C. provisions: "An action for 
breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of 
action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limita-
tion to not less than one year but may not extend it." V.C.C. § 2-725(1)(1978). 
For a cause of action brought under the Michigan Fine Arts Statute, the Revised Judica-
ture Act provides a six-year period for breach of contract: "The period of limitations is 6 
years for all other actions to recover damages or sums due for breach of contract." MICH. 
COMPo LAWS § 600.5807(8)(1967). 
Since the appellate court applied the accrual provision of the R.J.A. § 600.5833, the ap-
propriate limitation period was six years under the R.J.A. Applicstion of a four-year period 
of limitation did not, however, affect the outcome of the case as the court found that the 
plaintiff complied with the four-year limitation. 708 F.2d at 229. 
84. V.C.C. § 2-725(2)(1978)(emphasis added). 
85. 708 F.2d at 228. 
86. [d. 
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Revised Judicature Act which provides: "[i]n actions for damages 
based on breach of a warranty of quality or fitness the claim ac-
crues at the time the breach of the warranty is discovered or rea-
sonably should be discovered. "87 The court held that because Mrs. 
Lawson was untrained in art, she could not have reasonably dis-
covered the breach earlier than 1976.88 The suit was filed timely in 
1979, within the "four-year"89 statute of limitations period. 
Given the special Michigan statutory provisions dealing with fine 
art warranties,90 the Sixth Circuit's application of the Revised Ju-
dicature Act's accrual of cause of action provision was appropriate. 
However, in the absence of that special warranty provision, the ap-
pellate court would have been forced to deal with the U.C.C. stat-
ute of limitations and its accrual provision. The troublesome as-
pect of the U.C.C. provision is that under the general rule a cause 
of action accrues whether or not the aggrieved party is aware of the 
breach. Furthermore, the typical cause of action, where discovery 
of the breach might take in excess of four years, is a breach of 
warranty action. 
Statute of limitations provisions are intended to prevent individ-
uals from sleeping on their rights.91 Obviously, this underlying ra-
tionale for a limitation period is not supported in a case where the 
aggrieved party's cause of action is barred before the party is 
aware of any injury.92 As previously indicated, application of the 
U.C.C. general rule to the instant facts would have resulted in Mrs. 
87. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.5833 (1967). 
88. 708 F.2d at 229. 
89. See supra note 83. 
90. See supra note 79. 
91. The general purpose of statute of limitations is to avoid stale claims so that the 
opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend. Bigelow v. Walraven, 392 Mich. 566, 221 
N.W.2d 328 (1974); Wahl v. Brothers, 60 Mich. App. 66, 230 N.W.2d 311 (1975). 
92. The V.C.C. policy underpinning the statute of limitations provision are different 
from the historic policy considerations discussed at note 91, supra. The purpose of § 2-725 
was to introduce a uniform statute of limitations for sales contracta which would eliminate 
the jurisdictional variations and provide relief for concerns doing business on a nationwide 
scale whose contracts had been governed by different statutory periods. V.C.C. § 2-725 com-
ment (1978). In the typical commercial sale of goods contract, the defect and the related 
breach of warranty action would be discovered long before the four-year statutory period 
had expired. The Code comment further indicates that a four-year period was selected as 
most appropriate to modern business practice because it corresponds with the normal record 
keeping period. This rationale may no longer be justified in light of computer technology's 
capacity for indefinite storage of information with minimal space usage. 
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Lawson's cause of action being barred prior to her suspecting or 
learning that the pastel was a fake. 
As a consequence of such apparent unfairness, courts, when 
faced with application of the U.C.C. general rule, have developed a 
number of approaches to avoid the harsh result. Case law dealing 
with statute of limitations provisions is murky and muddled at 
best.98 
The first approach available to a court is to apply the exception 
language of the V.C.C. general rule, that "where a warranty ex-
plicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery 
of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause 
of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discov-
ered. "9. The Code comments do not recommend a test or shed any 
light on how to determine when a warranty "explicitly extends to 
future performance. "96 It should be clear, however, that this does 
not occur in the usual case but is the exception to the rule.96 Ex-
press warranties which extend for a specified period of time are 
said to fall into this exception category.97 On the other hand, 
courts are unlikely to find that an implied warranty extends to fu-
ture performance.98 Case law provides inconsistent analyses, be-
cause courts have difficulty determining which warranties extend 
to future performance. It is, therefore, possible for a court to use 
the exception standard to postpone accrual of a cause of action to 
avoid a diligent party from being prematurely barred. Perhaps the 
district court did just that in the instant case, particularly when 
faced with the jury's finding that the defendant had acted in bad 
faith. 
Another method for avoiding the tender of delivery accrual date, 
93. "Section 2-725 offers a sane and workable statutory scheme, but it is one the courts 
will infrequently follow when the plaintiff's blood has been spilled or when the defendant is 
a remote seller." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 420. 
94. U.C.C. § 2-725(2)(1978)(emphasis added). The district court in Lawson applied this 
language to the warranty regarding the Remington pastel. See supra note 76. 
95. The only reference to a future performance warranty in the official Code comments 
to § 2-725 states: "Subsection (2), providing that the cause of action accrues when the 
breach occurs, states an exception where the warranty extends to future performance." 
96. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 419. 
97. R. NODSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES, at 563 (1970). 
98. SCHMITT and HANKO, For Whom the Bell Tolls-An Interpretation of the UCC's 
Exception as to Accrual of a Cause of Action for Future Performance Warranties, 28 ARK. 
L. REV. 311, 317 (1974). 
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in a case involving personal injury, is for a court to apply a tort 
statute of limitations rather than the V.C.C. warranty limitation 
period. Typically, the tort action will accrue at the time of the in-
jury.99 Even though the limitation period is typically only two or 
three years in length, the plaintiff has been made aware of the 
cause of action by the injury and will not be barred without knowl-
edge of the claim.loo Part of the confusion results from the overlap 
of strict tort liability and contract breach of warranty. Many fact 
situations create both causes of action, accordingly, the problem 
becomes one of which statute of limitations to apply. Case law has 
not clarified when a cause of action should be labeled tort, rather 
than warranty, for purposes of statute of limitations.lol In several 
cases it appears that the court selected the provision on equitable 
considerations, to preserve rather than bar plaintiff's cause of 
action. 102 
Even in contract cases where no personal injury was involved, 
courts have avoided application of the shorter U.C.C. limitation 
period by labeling the contract as predominantly a service rather 
than goods contract. loa The six-year statute of limitations for ac-
tions on simple or implied contracts governs in a service con-
tract. 10• In an illustrative Michigan case, 1011 the plaintiff purchased 
99. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 144 (4th ed. 1971). The Michigan 
statute is worded somewhat differently: "The claim accrues at the time the wrong upon 
which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results." MICH. 
COMPo LAWS § 600.5827 (1967). Where the cause of action is to recover for personal injuries, 
it typically accrues when the plaintiff is injured. See, e.g., Pryber v. Marriott Corp., 98 Mich. 
App. 50, 296 N.W.2d 597 (1980), aff'd, 411 Mich. 887, 307 N.W.2d 333 (1981). 
100. In some jurisdictions a medical malpractice cause of action accrues when the plain-
tiff should have discovered the injury. Note, Medical Malpractice: A Survey of Statutes of 
Limitation, 3 SUFFOLK D.L.REV 597 (1969). 
101. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 416. 
102. By way of example, in the following cases the tnal court applied the four-year 
D.C.C. provision, preserving the plaintiff's cause of action, despite a privity bar. The appel-
late court reversed, finding the tort statutes of limitation applicable, barring the causes of 
action. Infante v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 49 A.D.2d 72, 371 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1975); Salvador 
v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 256 Pa. Super. 330,389 A.2d 1148 (1978); Becker v. Volkswagen 
of Am., Inc., 52 Cal. 3d 794, 125 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1975). ' 
103. See, e.g., Cacace v. Morcaldi, 37 Conn. 2d 735, 435 A.2d 1035 (1981); Perlmutter v. 
Don's Ford, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 628, 96 Misc.2d 719 (1978). Dixie Lime & Stone Co. v. Wig-
gins Scale Co., 144 Ga. App. 145, 240 S.E.2d 323 (1977). 
104. For Michigan's six-year statute of limitations, see MICH. COMPo LAWS § 
600.5807(8)(1967) and supra note 83 discussing its application in the instant case. 
105. H. Hirschfield Sons Co. v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 107 Mich. App. 720, 309 
N.W.2d 714 (1981). 
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a large in-ground railroad and truck scale from the defendant. 
Even though the plaintiff discovered cracks in the concrete surface 
which housed the scale shortly after installation, the complaint was 
not filed for seven years. The appellate court reversed and re-
manded the trial court's judgment that the U.C.C. standard of four 
years from tender of delivery barred the cause of action. The six-
year Revised Judicature Act statute of limitations,106 accruing 
when the breach of warranty was discovered or reasonably should 
have been discovered,107 applied. 
This commentator recommends a two-step analysis to courts 
faced with a statute of limitations dilemma. First, where mUltiple 
causes of action are plead, the statute of limitations applied should 
match the cause of action proved. For example, if a plaintiff estab-
lishes the elements of breach of implied warranty under the U.C.C. 
and strict liability in tort, but fails to give timely notice to the 
seller under U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a),t°8 the tort statute of limita-
tion should be applied. The statute of limitation provision applied 
should mirror the cause of action plead, proven, and not otherwise 
barred.109 Secondly, where application of the appropriate statutory 
provision proves unfair and inconsistent with the reason of the 
rule, the court need not apply the rule. llo The court should, how-
ever, acknowledge that the statutory limitation of remedy is being 
disregarded because the reason of the limitation is inapplicable. 
A final alternative is legislative action. Legislatures in several ju-
risdictionslll have addressed the problems presented by the four-
year period by adopting non-uniform amendments to section 2-
725. In several states the four-year period has been increased to 
106. Id. at 727, 309 N.W.2d at 719, applying MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.5807(8)(1967). 
107. Id. applying MICH. COMPo LAWS § 600.5833 (1967). 
108. Failure to give timely notice of breach of warranty under § 2-607 bars recovery. See, 
e.g., Wagmeister V. A.H. Robbins Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 964, 382 N.E.2d 23 (1978). 
109. This view is discussed at length in Justice Williams dissenting opinion in Parish V. 
B.F. Goodrich Co., 395 Mich. 271, 284, 235 N.W.2d 570, 576 (1975). If a plaintiff properly 
relies upon a V.C.C. warranty and chooses to base her claim upon the V.C.C., the statute of 
limitation contained in the Code should govern. Id. at 291, 235 N.W.2d at 579. 
110. See, S. MENTSCHIKOFF, COMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 11 (1970). Comment 1 to § 1-102 
provides: "[Courts] have disregarded a statutory limitation of remedy where the reason of 
the limitation did not apply .... Nothing in this Act stands in the way of the continuance 
of such actions by the courts." 
111. Fourteen jurisdictions have adopted variations from the official text: Alabama, Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode is-
land, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. 
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five ll2 or six1I3 years. In one state, a party suing for breach of war-
ranty, alleging a defect in the product, has ten years to commence 
a cause of action.1I4 More significantly, several jurisdictions have 
modified the time at which a cause of action accrues.m For exam-
ple, under the Alabama Code, "a cause of action for damages for 
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods shall accrue 
when the injury occurs."1I6 The most liberal non-uniform provision 
applies across the board to all breach of warranty actions and pro-
vides that the cause accrues "when the breach is or should be 
discovered. "117 
III. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
In Sawyer v. Arum,118 the court of appeals was asked to deter-
mine whether the defendant's letter of obligation promising to pay 
the plaintiff $25,000, was a separate enforceable contract or a pre-
liminary writing not intended to be part of the final contractual 
agreement between the defendant and heavyweight boxer, Leon 
Spinks. The district court, in a bench trial, found that the letter in 
question never became a part of the final integration. The Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the trial court, with one panel member dissenting. 
The dissenter found the letter to be a separate, enforceable agree-
ment.1I9 According to the dissenter, none of the evidence presented 
at trial showed the letter to be anything but a separate agreement. 
As such, the trial court's findings should have been reversed and 
the case remanded to determine whether the plaintiff had per-
formed the services required, entitling him to damages for breach 
of contract. 
Factually,120 the plaintiff was a trust officer in a Detroit bank 
112. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-725 (West 1963). 
113. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-725 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725 (Law. Co-op. 1976); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 402.725 (West 1964 & Supp. 1983). 
114. R.1. GEN LAWS § 6A-2-725 (Supp. 1983). 
115. ALA. CODE § 2-725 (1975); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-725 (1964 & West Supp. 
1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725 (Law. Co-op. 1976). 
116. ALA. CODE § 2-725 (1975). Similarly, see Maine statutory provision which applies to 
all breach of warranty personal injury cases, and provides that the cause of action accrues 
when the injury takes place. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-725 (1964 & West Supp. 1984). 
117. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-725 (Law. Co-op. 1976). 
118. 690 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1982). 
119. Id. at 595. 
120. The majority and dissenting opinions agree as to these facts. They disagree as to 
HeinOnline -- 1984 Det. C.L. Rev. 474 1984
474 Detroit College of Law Review [2:451 
administering funds for Spinks and acting as his interim manager. 
Plaintiff met with the defendant, a full-time boxing promoter, and 
Spinks' attorney to discuss future boxing matches. Three docu-
ments resulted from this meeting: one, a "Bout Agreement" which 
called for Spinks to fight Gerrie Coetzee in June of 1979 for 
$100,000 and fifty percent of all revenues in excess of $250,000; 
two, a letter granting defendant's corporation an option to promote 
future fights involving Spinks; and three, the letter, at issue in the 
instant case, agreeing to pay the plaintiff $25,000 for promotional 
and other services to be rendered. Spinks refused to fight for 
$100,000. Sometime later, the $100,000 figure in the "Bout Agree-
ment" was lined out and a $250,000 figure inserted. The defendant 
resigned this altered "Bout Agreement." 
The question presented was whether the defendant agreed to 
pay the plaintiff $25,000 only if Spinks agreed to fight for $100,000, 
as part of "one integral package,"121 or whether defendant was con-
tractually bound to pay plaintiff whether or not Spinks fought and 
regardless of the amount. Resolution of this question centers on 
application of the parol evidence rule.122 When a party claims that 
a writing represents the final and complete agreement of the par-
ties, the court must determine whether the parties intended the 
written instrument to be a final expression of their agreement-an 
integration.123 Once the court determines that the writing is an in-
whether the three writings are separate enforceable agreements. See text infra. 
121. 690 F.2d at 591. 
122. The most eminent authorities state the parol evidence rule as follows: 
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in writing to which 
they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract, 
evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotia-
tions will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing. 
3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 573 at 357 (1960). "[The parol evidence] rule requires ... the 
exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or written, where the parties have reduced their agree-
ment to an integrated writing." 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 631 at 948-49 (3rd ed. 1961). 
The modern statement of the rule can be found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 
213 (1979). 
123. 
Whether a writing has been adopted as an integrated agreement is a question of 
fact to be determined in accordance with all relevant evidence. The issue is dis-
tinct from the issues whether an agreement was made and whether the document 
is genuine, and also from the issue whether it was intended as a complete and 
exclusive statement of the agreement . . . . Ordinarily the issue whether there is 
an integrated agreement is determined by the trial judge in the first instance as a 
question preliminary to an interpretative ruling or to the application of the parol 
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tegration, it must then determine whether the integration is com-
plete or partial. l24 Under the parol evidence rule a complete inte-
gration cannot be contradicted or supplemented by extrinsic 
evidence of prior negotiations or agreements.l2G A partial integra-
tion may be supplemented by consistent additional terms.128 In the 
Sawyer case, the court had to decide whether the letter promising 
to pay the plaintiff $25,000 was an integration. 
Historically, Michigan courts appearl27 to have applied the re-
strictive "four corners" or "face of the document" test to deter-
mine the intention of the parties and to decide whether the parties 
intended the writing as a complete integration of their agree-
ment.12S Under this test a writing was presumed to express the in-
evidence rule . . . . After the preliminary determination, such questions as 
whether the agreement was in fact made may remain to be decided by the trier of 
fact .... [A] written agreement complete on its face is taken to be an integrated 
agreement in the absence of contrary evidence. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 comment c (1979). 
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 210(3) (1979) provides: "Whether an agree-
ment is completely or partially integrated is to be determined by the court as a question 
preliminary to determination of a question of interpretation or application of the parol evi-
dence rule." 
125. See supra note 122. 
126. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 216 (1979) provides: 
(1) Evidence of a consistent additional term is admissible to supplement an in-
tegrated agreement unless the court finds that the agreement was completely 
integrated. 
(2) An agreement is not completely integrated if the writing omits a consistent 
additional agreed term which is 
(a) agreed to for separate consideration, or 
(b) such a term as in the circumstances might naturally be omitted from 
the writing. 
127. The exact test used by mid-century Michigan courts is difficult to discern because 
frequently the test used to determine the intention of the parties in deciding the question of 
integration is not properly distinguished from the so-called "plain meaning" test used for 
interpreting or construing a writing. The plain meaning rule provides that where a writing 
appears to be plain and unambiguous on its face, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible. for pur-
poses of interpretation. 
The Michigan cases, see infra note 128, appear to lump the questions of intention to 
integrate and ambiguity together into one test, a combination of the "four corners" and 
"plain meaning" tests. A Michigan court under these old cases could look at the face of a 
document and determine simultaneously that the parties intended it to be a complete inte-
gration. The language being clear and unambiguous it would be construed according to its 
plain meaning without reference to extrinsic evidence. 
128. Brachman v. Wheelock, Inc., 343 Mich. 230, 72 N.W.2d 246 (1955); Sheldon-Seatz, 
Inc. v. Coles, 319 Mich. 401, 29 N.W.2d 832 (1947); Michigan Chandelier Co. v. Morse, 297 
Mich. 41, 297 N.W. 64 (1941). 
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tentions of the parties and was deemed a complete integration, an 
embodiment of all the rights and obligations of the parties as to 
the subject matter covered by the writing, if the document ap-
peared entire on its face. A court, by merely reviewing the writing 
itself, determined whether the parties intended a complete integra-
tion of their agreement. A writing complete on its face, without 
facial ambiguity,129 was an integration. Consideration of extrinsic 
evidence to decide whether such a writing constituted an integra-
tion was prohibited. Plaintiff apparently intimated that this was 
the approach the court should use in determining whether the let-
ter was an integration. 130 
The district and appellate courts rejected this approach, and ap-
plied the more recent Michigan Supreme Court pronouncements131 
with regard to establishing the existence of an integration. "Extrin-
sic evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or negotia-
tions is admissible as it bears on this threshhold question of 
whether the written instrument is such an 'integrated' agree-
ment."132 Accordingly, the court applied the Restatement rule that 
"[a]greements and negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with 
the adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish 
that the writing is or is not an integrated agreement."133 
In examining the other writings and testimony of the parties to 
determine whether the letter was an integrated agreement, the dis-
trict court and a majority of the appellate court found that the 
parties intended the three original documents to be treated as one 
integral package.134 However, Spinks declined the terms of that 
package. When the "Bout Agreement" was subsequently altered, it 
became the final integration of the parties. The two letters, which 
were part of the originally negotiated package, were not incorpo-
rated into the final agreement. 
129. Michigan courts included this "facial anlbiguity" language when applying the "face 
of the document test." See supra note 127. 
130. 690 F.2d at 593. 
131. Goodwin, Inc. v. Coe Pontiac, Inc., 392 Mich. 195, 220 N.W.2d 664 (1974), rev'd, 43 
Mich. App. 640, 204 N.W.2d 749 (1972); N.A.G. Enters., v. All State Indus., 407 Mich. 407, 
285 N.W.2d 770 (1979), rev'd, 85 Mich. App. 194, 270 N.W.2d 738 (1978). 
132. 407 Mich. 407, 410 n.3, 285 N.W.2d 770, 771 n.3 (1979). 
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214(a)(1979). 
134. The Sixth Circuit arrived at this decision in the absence of any evidence that the 
plaintiff understood that the three documents constituted one agreement. See 690 F.2d at 
592 n.l. 
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The dissenter, in evaluating the evidence, found the letter to be 
a separate agreement, an integration, primarily because of an ab-
sence of evidence establishing that the plaintiff understood that he 
would receive the $25,000 only if Spinks agreed to fight for 
$100,000 pursuant to the original "Bout Agreement".l8II The dis-
senter agreed with the majority as to the law to be applied; he dis-
agreed with the factual findings. 
IV. SEPARATE CONTRACT DOCTRINE 
The case of UMIC Government Securities v. Pioneer Mortgage 
CO.138 presents two contract questions. First, was UMIC's retention 
of monies due Pioneer on a prior separate contract, until comple-
tion of a subsequent contract, an anticipatory repudiation of the 
subsequent contract? Secondly, did the retention alone render Pio-
neer so insecure as to demand adequate assurance of 
performance?137 
UMIC and Pioneer entered into a number of contracts involving 
the purchase and sale of Government National Mortgage Associa-
tion certificates (GNMAs).188 Pursuant to a May 14, 1980 contract, 
UMIC was required to deliver eleven GNMAs to Pioneer and Pio-
neer was obligated to deliver thirteen GNMAs to UMIC. On the 
settlement day, May 14, the GMNAs were paired off and Pioneer 
135. 1d. at 595. 
136. 707 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1983). 
137. V.C.C. § 2-609(1)(1978), dealing with demand for adequate assurance of perform-
ance, provides: 
A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the other's expecta-
tion of receiving due performance will not be impaired. When reasonable grounds 
for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party the other may 
in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance and until he recieves 
such assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance for 
which he has not already received the agreed return. 
There is a similar provision in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251(1)(1979) 
which states: 
Where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor will commit a breach 
by non-performance that would of itself give the obligee a claim for damages for 
total breach under § 243, the obligee may demand adequate assurance of due per-
formance and may. if reasonable, suspend any performance for which he has not 
already received the agreed exchange until he receives such assurance. 
For a comparison of the two sections see generally WHITE, Eight Cases and Section 251, 67 
CORNELL L. REV. 841 (1982). 
138. The purchase and sale of GNMAs is similar to that of commodities, with delivery to 
be made at a future date called a settlement date. 
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delivered two GNMAs to UMIC, which in turn paid two million 
dollars to Pioneer. UMIC owed Pioneer an additional $92,895.82 in 
trading profits. ls9 UMIC retained the trading profits because 
UMIC questioned Pioneer's ability to perform on the June 18, 
1980 contracts (June contract). 
The withheld funds formed the basis of the dispute which led to 
the repudiation of the June contract. UMIC understood that Pio-
neer agreed to allow UMIC to withhold the $92,895.82 until the 
GNMA transactions of June 18, were completed. Further, this al-
leged understanding was delineated in a letter from UMIC to Pio-
neer dated May 30. Pioneer, on the other hand, in a letter dated 
June 4, stated that there was no such agreement. Therefore, Pio-
neer considered the retention an anticipatory repudiation of the 
June contract.HO On June 5,· UMIC expressly stated to Pioneer its 
intention to perform the June contract, proposed to tender a check 
for the withheld funds and made other assurances that no antici-
patory repudiation had been made by UMIC. The following day 
UMIC filed suit seeking injuctive relief and damages. HI Pioneer 
filed a counterclaim for the withheld trading profits. 
Although GNMAs are not goods, the trial court applied Article 
II of the U.C.C. by way of analogy.142 The trial court found: one, 
Pioneer never agreed to UMIC's retention of the trading profits 
139. The amount of the trading profit is determined by the differences in the contract 
price for each individual GNMA. 
140. In letters dated May 28, 1980 and June 4, 1980, Pioneer questioned UMIC's 
financial condition. In the June 4 letter, Pioneer stated it considered UMIC's retention of 
funds as an anticipatory repudiation of the June contract and therefore Pioneer was under 
no obligation to make further deliveries of GNMAs to UMIC. 707 F.2d at 252. 
141. Pursuant to the law of Tennessee, when the conduct of one party evidences an in-
tent not to be bound by a future contract, the other party has the option to terminate the 
contract and maintain an action for damages caused by the anticipatory repudiation. City of 
Memphis v. Ford Motor Co., 304 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1962); Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. 
Hardi-Gardens Supply of Illinois, 380 F. Supp. 930 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Church of Christ 
Home for Aged v. Nashville Trust Co., 184 Tenn. 629, 202 S.W.2d 178 (1947). 
142. 47-2-105 TENN. CODE ANN. comment 1 (1966) states: 
Id. 
"Investment securities" are expressly excluded from the coverage of this Article. It 
is not intended by this exclusion, however, to prevent the application of a particu-
lar section of this Article by analogy to securities (as was done with the Original 
Sales Act in Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479, 99 A.L.R. 269 (1934» when 
the reason for that section makes such application sensible and the situation in-
volved is not covered by the Article of this Act dealing specifically with such se-
curities (Article 8). 
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due in the May contracts; two, UMIC's retention of the funds was 
a unilateral attempt to change the June contracts; and three, Pio-
neer's suspension of performance was authorized by UMIC's ac-
tions. As a matter of law, the court held that UMIC's letter of May 
30, constituted a total repudiation by UMIC of the June contracts. 
A judgment was entered in favor of Pioneer on its counterclaim for 
$92,895.82 plus interest at 11 % % .143 
UMIC appealed on two contractual grounds. UMIC contended 
that it did not repudiate the June contracts and that its actions 
did not constitute sufficient grounds to justify demand for ade-
quate assurances. H. The court of appeals affirmed Pioneer's 
$92,895.82 recovery and reversed the trial court's determination 
that UMIC repudiated the June contracts. 1411 
Even though Pioneer treated UMIC's letter of May 30, as an 
overt communication of an intention not to perform the June con-
tracts, the Sixth Circuit held that UMIC's retention of funds was 
not an anticipatory repudiation of the June contracts.146 UMIC's 
letter of May 30,1.7 states only that UMIC was withholding the 
trading profits until completion of the June contracts. This was 
not an overt communication not to perform the June contracts. On 
the contrary, it declared UMIC's intention to perform the June 
contracts. The Sixth Circuit went on to state that UMIC's reten-
tion of funds was merely an attempt to modify the May 
contracts. 148 
143. The rate of interest to be charged was also at issue in this case. The trial court 
awarded 113,4 % in accord with the alleged agreement between Pioneer and UMIC allowing 
UMIC to retain the funds (with interest at 11 3,4 % payable) until June 18, 1980. The court 
of appeals held that only the statutory interest rate should be awarded. Since the trial court 
found that the agreement was not endorsed by both parties, it was incorrect to grant Pio-
neer interest under a unilateral agreement. 707 F.2d at 254. 
144. See supra note 137. 
145. 707 F.2d at 254. 
146. [d. 
147. UMIC's May 30 letter reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Pursuant to recent telephone conversations with UMIC, this letter will confirm 
that UMIC is presently holding $92,895.82 of monies owed to Pioneer Mortgage 
Company regarding May GNMA transactions. UMIC will hold the money pending 
the completion of the June 18, 1980 GNMA transactions and the receipt of any 
open securities. Accordingly, UMIC has agreed to pay interest on such funds at 
the current lending rate, initially IB~ percent. 
[d. at 253. 
148. UMIC's action was, in essence, more than an attempt to modify. UMIC breached 
the May contract by withholding performance. UMIC was obligated to pay the trading prof-
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Pioneer was obligated to perform on the June contract even if 
UMIC breached the May contract because the trial court held the 
contracts to be separate. I.e Under the "separate contract doctrine" 
enunciated in Northwest Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Continental Forest 
Products, Inc. 1IIo a party is not excused from performing contrac-
tual duties simply because the other party has breached a prior, 
separate agreement between them. In Northwest, three separate 
contracts llH were entered into between the seller and buyer. A dis-
pute arose over the first contract and, therefore, the buyer refused 
to pay for the second contract. The seller cancelled shipment on 
the third contract because the buyer failed to pay for the second 
contract. The court held that a party may not refuse performance 
simply because the other party has breached a separate contract. 1112 
In the instant case, the trial court found the contracts between 
Pioneer and UMIC to be separate contracts.1Ii3 Accordingly, the 
Sixth Circuit applied the separate contract doctrine of Northwest. 
Pioneer was not warranted in refusing performance on the future 
contracts on the basis of UMIC's prior breach. Pioneer's letter of 
June 41114 was an overt communication of an intention not to per-
form the June contract, constituting an anticipatory repudiation of 
the June contracts. UI~ 
As additional support for its decision, the Sixth Circuit asserted 
that the case of National Farmers Organization v. Coast Trading 
CO.,1II6 was analogous to the present case. National Farmers in-
its to Pioneer. "When performance is due ... any failure to render it is a breach." FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 12, at 576. 
149. 707 F.2d at 253. 
150. 261 Or. 480, 495 P.2d 744 (1972). National Farmers Org. v. Coast Trading Co., 488 
F. Supp. 944 (D. Or. 1977); National Farmers Org. v. Bartlett and Co. Grain, 560 F.2d 1350 
(8th Cir. 1977). 
151. The first contract involved the sale of plywood. The plywood was never delivered. 
The second contract concerned the sale of a carload of pine lumber. The plywood was not 
delivered, thus the buyer refused to pay for the pine lumber. The third contract involved a 
carload of "studs." The seller cancelled the shipment of the studs to the buyer because the 
buyer failed to pay for the pine lumber. 
152. 261 Or. at 490, 495 P.2d at 750. 
153. 707 F.2d at 253. 
154. Pioneer's letter of June 4, 1980 stated they were under no obligation to deliver on 
the June contracts. 707 F.2d at 252-53. 
155. The test of anticipatory repudiation in § 2-610 is an unequivocal, positive statement 
of an unwillingness to perform. See CALAMARI & PERRILLO, supra note 7, at 460; WHITE & 
SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 213-14. 
156. 488 F. Supp. 944 (D. Or. 1977). 
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volved a series of contracts for the sale and purchase of grain. Both 
parties contended that they suspended performance because the 
other party either failed to deliver or make payments. 11I7 The dis-
trict court in National Farmers cited Northwest as authority when 
it decided the issue of anticipatory repudiation on a contract by 
contract basis. IllS The National Farmers court held that even 
though the buyer withheld payment on some contracts, the seller 
still had a duty to perform on the future contracts.11I9 
Other jurisdictions are in accord with the Sixth Circuit in hold-
ing that the breach of one contract does not excuse performance 
under another separate contract. ISO Nevertheless, commentators 
criticize adoption of the "separate contract doctrine" as an inflexi-
ble rule of law. lSI A primary criticism aimed at cases like North-
west is the imposition of a duty to demand adequate assurances on 
one of the parties but not the other. The buyer withholds payment, 
in essence a self-help remedy, while the seller is required to de-
mand assurances. 
Surely the rule for which Northwest Lumber is to stand is not that if a 
party is clever enough to commit the first material breach, a duty of de-
manding adequate assurances will always be imposed on the other party, 
thereby destroying the right of the aggrieved party to terminate for ma-
terial breach. 182 
As previously noted, the second issue on appeal was whether 
VMIC's actions constituted sufficient grounds to justify demand 
for adequate assurance of performance. The V.C.C. and Restate-
ment procedures for demanding adequate assurance of perform-
ance are comparable but not identical. ls3 The sections were 
designed as a lawyer's weapon to be used to prevent litigation. l64 
157. [d. at 945-46. 
158. [d. at 951-52. 
159. [d. at 950. 
160. See, e.g., National Farmers Org. v. Bartlett & Co., 560 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1977). 
For pre-U.C.C. cases see Twitchell v. Robertson Paper Co., 94 Vt. 473, 111 A.570 (1920); 
Rock v. Gaede, 111 Kan. 214, 207 P. 323, 27 A.L.R. 1152 (1922); Hanson & Parker v. Wit-
tenberg, 205 Mass. 319, 91 N.E. 383 (1910). 
161. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 696 (1960); KAUFMAN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 696 (1982 
Supp., Part 1). 
162. KAUFMAN, supra note 161, at 706. 
163. For U.C.C. § 2-609 (1978), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 (1979), and 
the article comparing them see WHITE, supra note 161, at 706. 
164. WHITE, supra note 137, at 842-43, indicates that the provisions could be construed 
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U.C.C. section 2-609, applied in the instant case, assures both 
seller and buyer that their "expectation of receiving due perform-
ance will not be impaired."166 Thus, once a party becomes insecure 
about the other party's performance, the party's expectation is im-
paired and that party may demand adequate assurance of perform-
ance.166 Once demanded, failure to provide an adequate assurance 
within thirty days constitutes a repudiation of the contract.167 In 
order for a demand for assurances to be effective, the party de-
manding the assurances must have commercially reasonable 
grounds for insecurity. 168 
In UMIC, neither Pioneer nor UMIC demanded adequate assur-
ances of performance. However, the court does make it clear that 
Pioneer had no reasonable grounds for insecurity to resort to sec-
tion 2-609 demands. Even though UMIC withheld $92,895.82, they 
did make the two million dollar payment on the settlement date. 
Thus, Pioneer simply had no grounds. 
The result in UMIC may be contrasted with the Illinois Appel-
late Court decision in Toppert v. Bunge Corp.,169 where the court 
held that a seller was justified in refusing to perform on future 
contracts where the buyer withheld payment on prior contracts. 
The cases may be distinguished on three bases: Toppert had rea-
sonable grounds for insecurity; he demanded adequate assurance 
of performance; and Bunge's failure to respond to the seller's de-
mand for adequate assurance constituted a repudiation. 
For the practitioner to differentiate the cases and advise the cli-
ent as to appropriate action is not as easy. Whether particular con-
duct constitutes a repudiation is frequently a debatable question. 
The instant case is illustrative. The trial court found UMIC's con-
duct a total repudiation of the contract. The Sixth Circuit ex-
as such, but that his analysis of cases decided under the V.C.C. provision suggests that the 
sections are primarily a judge's weapon. 
165. V.C.C. § 2·609(1)(1978). 
166. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 208. 
167. V.C.C. § 2-609(4)(1978) provides: "Mter receipt of a.justified demand failure to 
provide within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days such assurance of due perform-
ance as is adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is a repudiation of the 
contract." 
168. V.C.C. § 2-609(2)(1978) provides that "[b]etween merchants the reasonbleness of 
grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be determined ac-
cording to commercial standards." 
169. 60 Ill. App. 3d 607, 377 N.E.2d 324 (1978). 
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amined the same evidence and found no overt communication by 
UMIC not to perform, therefore, no repudiation. Advising a client 
that performance may be ceased, because the words or acts of the 
other party establish a repudiation, is an uncertain proposition. 
Furthermore, demanding adequate assurance of performance 
does not always solve the problem of whether the questioned con-
duct is a repudiation. A justifiable demand for adequate assurance 
requires reasonable grounds for insecurity on the part of the de-
manding party. If a court determines that there is no ground for 
insecurity, failure to give assurance is not a repudiation, but may 
trigger conduct by the demanding party which constitutes a repu-
diation or breach. Additionally, what establishes adequate assur-
ance to such a demand is not clear. Although not deemed satisfac-
tory assurance by the client, once a party responds to the demand 
by giving oral or written assurances, the responding party's con-
duct cannot with certainty be treated as a repudiation. From a 
practical standpoint, the Code mechanism for demanding adequate 
assurance, intended as an innovation to deal with the dilemma of 
whether conduct is or is not a repudiation, does not assure alloca-
tion of responsibility for contract breach. 
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